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THEOLOGY AND THE NECESSITY OF NATURES 
W. S. Anglin 
In this paper we give a definition of a 'nature' which (1) captures the idea 
that a nature is a kind of constant in the midst of change; (2) does not sanction 
the inference of the conclusion 'Christ has to be human' from the premiss 
'Christ has human nature'; (3) enables us to defend the logical coherence of 
certain theological claims; and (4) accords with many of our pre-analytic 
intuitions about 'natures.' 
Each of the following theological claims involves the concept of a 'nature.' 
1. It is possible for something to have two natures: human and divine. 
2. The Word has the divine nature essentially but human nature accidentally. 
3. It is not possible for a non-divine human to acquire the divine nature. 
4. Non-divine humans who become Christians are given the higher nature 
of the 'spiritual man. 'I 
In this paper I offer an analysis of a 'nature' and I use this analysis to defend 
the above claims against the charge of logical incoherence. 
I 
A nature is a property or set of properties which is very important for the 
individual whose nature it is. Indeed, one might easily think that a nature is 
an essential property in the sense that the proposition 
s has nature H 
implies the proposition 
Necessarily, Hs. 
If this were true, the fact that the Word of God assumed human nature would 
imply that he is human in every possible world. 2 However, there are possible 
worlds in which there are no human beings, possible worlds in which there 
is no need for an incarnation, and possible worlds in which, although there 
is a need for an incarnation, God simply chooses to express his compassion 
in some other way. 
Quite apart from theological concerns, there are good reasons for rejecting 
the idea that a nature is an essential property. In this section we consider two 
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such reasons. In the next section we offer a positive account of what it is to 
be a 'nature.' 
One reason for rejecting the idea that a nature is an essential property is 
that we often use the word 'nature' to refer to a psychological orientation 
which, although it is an enduring and important part of a person, is not 
essential to his being. We might agree that someone is an introvert 'by nature' 
but we would not hold a funeral if he became an extravert. Aristotle reminds 
us that it is 'easier to change a habit than to change one's nature' but he 
nonetheless envisages the possibility of changing one's nature. 3 
A second reason for rejecting the idea that a nature is an essential property 
is that the universe is not as neat as our conceptual system. The nature of a 
thing has to do with what it is like in nature. However, whereas a system of 
essential properties is perfectly regular and static, nature is not. 
Consider the following: a) crows are easy to distinguish from their back-
ground environment; b) crows do not change a great deal during their adult 
life; c) crows give birth only to crows. If these three statements were false, 
I doubt we would even have a concept of 'crow.' That there are crows and 
that it makes sense to talk about their nature is bound up with the fact that, 
at least in one possible world, nature works in a regular and recurring manner 
to produce the mobile objects which are crows. However, nature need not 
(and does not) work in a perfectly regular and recurring manner to do this. 
The fact that crows have a certain nature is not undermined by some infre-
quent exceptions to nature's uniformity. For example, even if, due to a mu-
tation, a crow occasionally begets something that is not crow-like, we can 
stiI1 talk about 'normal' crows and their nature. 
A nature is something which characterises or determines how the thing whose 
nature it is normally works, grows and so on but it is not essential to that thing. 
Suppose we have a robin calIed Jennifer. Suppose that, perhaps thanks to some 
quantum mechanical freak, Jennifer gradually turns into a crow and then back 
into a robin. In her final robin stage she remembers many things she learnt in 
both her previous stages. The change here is drastic but not so drastic as to 
force us to conclude that Jennifer has ceased to exist. Such a bird is highly 
unlikely but not even nomologically impossible. Moreover, she has for a 
while the nature of a crow without being a crow necessarily. 
As another counterexample to the thesis that if something has a nature then 
it is necessary that it have that nature, consider the possibility of a rosebush 
which loses its thorns and begins to grow tomatoes-while still bearing roses. 
The resulting hybrid is such that it qualifies both as a rosebush and as a tomato 
plant. It might have remained as a mere rosebush but it is now also a tomato 
plant. Thus it has the nature of a tomato plant without being a tomato plant 
essentially. 
One might object to this example that, at the molecular level, my hybrid 
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rosebush-tomato plant is really neither. How can it have the genetic informa-
tion of a tomato plant if it is growing roses? How can it have the genetic 
information of a rosebush if it lacks thorns? 
My reply to this objection is that I am not committed to a program of 
explicating 'natures' in terms of scientific 'essences.' I do not deny that such 
a program would be worthwhile but, at least in this paper, I am engaged not 
in a botany project but in a logical analysis of ordinary language concepts. 
On this level, the word 'rosebush' applies to plants which, say, bear roses. It 
is in this sense that I claim that it is logically possible that something be both 
a rosebush and a tomato plant. 
Let me try to make my position clearer in terms of an example from George 
Seddon's article "Logical Possibility. "4 Seddon dislikes the idea that it is 
logically possible that an iron bar float in water. What he means is that iron 
and water, having by definition certain atomic structures, have certain spe-
cific gravities, and that of iron is greater than that of water. Given the 'nature' 
of iron and water at the atomic level, it is a logical consequence that iron 
does not float in water. 
I do not take this approach to 'logical possibility.' I take something to be 
logically possible if it is broadly logically possible in the sense given in 
Plantinga's book The Nature of Necessity. On this view it is logically possible 
for a bar of iron to float on water. For the protons in the iron might possibly 
have a lower mass than the protons in water. Or the contact of iron and water 
might possibly produce, via a fifth fundamental force, a kind of magnetic 
field which would all but raise the iron on its own, leaving, however, a little 
work for the buoyant force of the water to do, so that we can really say that 
the iron is 'floating.' Seddon is presupposing that the basic structure of matter 
as we know it is a fixed given. But it is broadly logically possible that, say, 
not all protons have the same mass. Conceived in my fashion, rather than in 
a way that is tied to the actual physics of the world, logical possibilities cover 
a wide territory. In particular, it is logically possible that a plant be a rosebush 
and also a tomato plant. This hybrid might have a chemistry very different 
from any that could be found in this universe but it would still fall under our 
ordinary language concepts of 'rosebush' and 'tomato plant.' Regardless of 
how a botanist would classify it, it would instantiate properties like 'having 
jagged leaves,' 'bearing roses on thin stems' and so on, and thus on an 
ordinary dictionary definition of 'rosebush,' it would count as a rosebush. 
Similarly, it would count as a tomato plant. 
Note, moreover, that I am not saying that this plant has some hybrid na-
ture-as if the two one-place predicates 'being a rosebush' and 'being a 
tomato plant' could somehow mix together in a Platonic heaven. My plant is 
a hybrid not because it instantiates some hybrid nature but because it instan-
tiates two distinct natures. When I say that a book is both blue and heavy, I 
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do not mean to imply that it possesses some confused property of blue-heav-
iness. I mean simply that it is blue, and also heavy. Similarly, when I say that 
a plant is both a rosebush and a tomato plant, I mean only that it is a rosebush, 
and also a tomato plant. This point is important for what follows because I 
shall compare Christ to this rosebush-tomato plant, and I do not want the 
reader to think that my comparison implies that he does not have two distinct 
natures. When I say that Christ is a divine human, I mean simply that he has 
the property of being human, and also the property of being divine. I do not 
mean that he has a single property which is somehow a compromise between 
these two properties. I think that Christ is a 'hybrid' of man and God not in 
the sense that there is some hybrid nature which he instantiates but in the 
sense, simply, that he possesses the property of being human and also the 
property of being divine. 
II 
When we say that x partakes of human nature, we do not want to say that 
x is human in every possible world in which it exists. However, we do want 
to say that normally x will remain human in any possible world that might 
be described as probable. We want to say something like this: if x changed 
into something not human then, probably, x would no longer exist. These 
considerations suggest the following definition of a 'nature.' 
Let H be a property such that it makes sense to talk of a substance x having 
that property at a time t. In particular, H is not to have the form 'being-P-at-
time-t.' For example, H is not to be a property like 'being human in 1989.' 
For it would be redundant to talk of someone having that property in, say, 
1990. 'Being human in 1989' is what one might call a timelessly possessed 
property. These I wish to rule out. 
Suppose, moreover, that it is not highly improbable that an existing object 
have the property of being H, and not highly improbable that an existing 
object have the property of not being H. (I do not think that non-existent 
objects can have properties but I include the word 'existing' in case the reader 
does.) For example, H is not to be a property like 'eXisting' or 'never having 
been blown up by an atomic bomb.' As another example, H is not to be the 
property of 'not having suffered an accident which normally causes the an-
nihilation of its victims.' For it is highly improbable that an existing object 
have the property of not being H. 
Given these constraints, we say that 
H is a nature 
if and only if 
for every thing x (allowing, however, one or two exceptions), if x has H just 
before a time t then the conditional probability of 
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on 
x continues to exist after t 
x ceases at t to have H (but does not cease to have any other property 
whose loss is not entailed by the loss of H) 
is very low (i.e., is 0 or only very slightly greater than 0). 
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For example, 'canine' is a nature because it is highly improbable that any 
dog survive the loss of this property. On the other hand, 'being a French 
speaker' is not a nature because it is highly probable that a French speaker 
survive the loss of his ability to speak French. Forgetting a language does not 
cause annihilation. 
The above definition is long, and so I offer what I take to be an equivalent 
but shorter version: 
H is a nature 
if and only if 
it is highly improbable that something still exist if it is no longer H. 
Note that in the shorter version, the improbability is compatible with there 
being one or two entities that will very probably survive the loss of a nature 
H. One or two exceptions will not distort the probability distribution. This 
point is important because 'human' is a nature, and I want to say that, whether 
or not he ceases to be human, the Word of God will certainly continue to 
exist. 
At this point the reader may wonder why I need to bring in probability. If 
I am going to make an exception for the Word of God, why do I not just give 
some very simple definition of a 'nature'? For if it turns out that Christ's 
being human leads to some awkward consequence on this definition, I need 
only say that Christ is an exception. 
To this I reply that I wish to give not just any facile definition of 'nature' 
but one that has some logical weight. And I believe that 'natures' really are 
tied to probabilities. Second, an exception is quite a natural thing to have if 
you are dealing with probabilities. If you do not have a probabilistic situation, 
however, an exception will seem ad hoc. Third, in section VI, I wish to talk 
about the 'spiritual nature' of the saints, and I cannot plausibly make stark 
exceptions for all of them. 
Note that the definition does not apply to timelessly possessed properties 
like 'being an even number.' We do not say that 16 is even at three o'clock. 
For our purposes, this does not matter. By means of suitable complications, 
we could extend the definition to cover the case of mathematical properties 
and any other timelessly possessed properties. 5 However, this extrapolation 
would not help us in the defence of the logical coherence of the four theo-
logical claims. As far as God is concerned, whether he exists timelessly or 
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not, we shall assume that he relates to time in such a way that it makes sense 
to say things like 
God is at all times omnipotent 
or 
God will still be omnipotent tomorrow morning. 
We shall also assume that if it makes sense in the first place to say that God 
is human then it also makes sense to say that 
God did not have a human nature in 20 Be but he did have a human nature 
in 20 AD. 
There are no doubt other ways than mine of defining a 'nature.' For example, 
one might wish to be more 'scientific' and relate 'natures' more closely to 
the latest theories of matter. In any case, the definition I have offered can be 
recommended for the following four reasons: (1) it captures the idea that a 
nature is a kind of constant in the midst of change; (2) it does not sanction 
the inference of the conclusion 'x has to be H' from the premiss 'x has nature 
H'; (3) it enables us to defend the logical coherence of the four theological 
claims against certain objections; and (4) it accords with many of our pre-
analytic intuitions about natures. In the next section we shall tackle the 
theology. In this section we give some examples to show that our definition 
does indeed function in a 'reasonable' manner. 
1. H = being a human-being. It is most improbable that Socrates (or 
any other ordinary human) change into something non-human without ceas-
ing to exist. Thus being a human is a nature. 
Note that on a Pythagorean view, it often happens that the same entity is 
first a man, then a fish, then a bean, and then a man again. This, precisely, 
is a view which I take to be as highly improbable as the alleged events 
themselves. Indeed, I think it logically incoherent that a person become a 
bean without ceasing to exist. 
2. H = being a non-human. 'Being a human' is a nature because it 
marks human beings off from the rest of reality in a way that is very important 
to their identity. There is, as it were, a dangerously high wall between the 
human and the non-human, and any human being crossing over it puts his 
very existence at risk. The same wall, it seems, would prevent a non-human 
entity from easily acquiring human nature. Indeed, the definition does imply 
that 'being a non-human' is also a nature. 
Against this view, one might raise the following point. Let x be some 
biological material capable of joining together to form a human being. Since 
it is not improbable that x survive the change from being a non-human to 
being a human, the definition implies that being non-human is not a nature. 
To this I reply that a human being is not a human body, and a human body 
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is not the biological material of which it was made. Thus being a non-human 
really is a nature. 
3. H = being brown. This is not a nature according to the definition 
because an object picked at random may very weH survive the change from 
being brown to being non-brown. 
4. H = being an introvert. If we assume that being an introvert is a 
fixed psychological disposition much more basic to a person's identity than, 
say, his racial characteristics, then it does foHow that this is a nature, and it 
is literally true that some people are introverts 'by nature.' However, if it is 
logically possible that, say, Martians regularly fluctuate between being intro-
verted and being extraverted, then H is not a nature. However, Martians or 
not, we can at least say that the property of being a human introvert is most 
likely a nature. 
S. H = being a sexy human. A sexy human being will normally cease 
to be sexy with old age. Thus, on the definition, being a sexy human is not 
a nature. 
6. H = being divine. If a divine being (Le. Yahweh) somehow ceased 
to be divine then he would also cease to exist. It just could not be true that 
some non-divine being used to be God but is now a mere creature. Hence 
being divine is a nature. 
7. H = being a submarine. If a submarine is graduaHy transformed 
into a truck, does the original vehicle cease to exist? Should the owner say, 
'I used to have a submarine but now I have a truck'? Should he say, 'my 
submarine is now a truck'? I am not sure. Whether 'being a submarine' is a 
nature or not is a moot point and, happily, this is reflected in the definition. 
Neither by an appeal to common sense, nor by an appeal to the definition, 
can we decide whether 'being a submarine' is a nature. 
We may conclude from the above examples that in many cases our defini-
tion of a nature fits with our pre-analytic notion of a nature. 
III 
In this section we consider the first of the four theological claims, namely, 
the claim that 
It is possible for a substance to have two natures: human and divine. 
Being human and being divine are both natures in our sense. Moreover, there 
is nothing to prevent an object from having two natures: Socrates has the 
nature of a human being and also the nature of a living being. The question 
is therefore simply whether, at one and the same time, the same individual 
can be both human and divine. Since this question is not directly related to 
the topic of natures, we shall just offer one or two comments on it. 
If one supposes that all human beings exist contingently, or that no divine 
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being has a body, then nothing is at the same time both human and divine. 
However, it is not necessary to make these suppositions: no dictionary gives 
'contingent' as one of the defining properties of 'human,' and many religions 
hold that a God can have a body. If we take seriously the fact that God made 
man in his own image, we should not balk at the idea that one can give 
reasonable definitions of 'human' and 'divine' in such a way that these two 
properties are compatible. For example, one might define a divine being as 
a noncontingent person who has the power knowingly to create or destroy 
any contingent object, and one might define a human being as a rational 
life-form with such-and-such a basic appearance. Assuming that it is logically 
possible that there be a divine being in the above sense, it does not seem 
impossible that he be able to interact with a human mind and body in such a 
way as to be himself human. 
There are, of course, some difficulties. Does a person who is both divine 
and human think like God or like a human being? For example, is he able to 
solve mathematical problems far beyond the limits of human intelligence? 
One answer to this question is that God can somehow limit his intelligence 
for awhile. Another answer is that there is no limit on human intelligence. A 
third answer is that the divine human has two minds: his divine mind knows 
all about his human mind but his human mind has only limited access to his 
divine mind. (Here one thinks of psychoanalytic studies done on persons with 
more than one stream of consciousness.) A fourth answer to the question is 
that a divine human should always be seen either 'as divine' or 'as human.' 
Every assertion about such a person should be interpreted to include a qual-
ifier of the form 'in his divine nature' or 'in his human nature.' For example, 
the assertion 
Jesus could solve advanced calculus problems 
should be interpreted to mean either 
Jesus, in his human nature, could solve advanced calculus problems 
or 
Jesus, in his divine nature, could solve advanced calculus problems. 
On the first interpretation, the assertion is false, since an ordinary man living 
in first century Palestine could not solve advanced calculus problems. On the 
second interpretation, however, the assertion is true, since the Word of God 
is omniscient. 
There are also problems with the body of a divine human. Can a divine 
human run at the rate of 1000 kilometers an hour? Can he build a house in 
5 seconds? Perhaps we should say that, in his divine nature, Jesus could have 
built a house in 5 seconds. But then it sounds odd to talk about Jesus doing 
a purely human activity 'in his divine nature.' 
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Another difficulty is that it somehow sounds wrong to say that God is a 
human being. Does this 'wrongness' indicate that there really is an underlying 
logical incoherence? Here, I think not. Here, I think it is just a matter of 
linguistic convention. Christians, at any rate, seem to understand the word 
'God' differently, depending on whether it is a subject or a predicate. When 
Christians use 'God' as the subject of a sentence, they think of that word as 
referring to the invisible Trinity, and they therefore do not want to follow 
that subject with any predicate which somehow clashes with that notion. 
However, when they use the word 'God' in a predicate, they are sometimes 
thinking of God only in the vague sense of a divine being. For example, 
Christians say that the Holy Spirit is God but they do not say that God is the 
Holy Spirit. For in the subject position 'God' means 'the invisible Trinity' 
and it is not true (on the Christian view) that the whole Trinity is the Holy 
Spirit. I claim, then, that the only reason that it sounds wrong to say that God 
is a human being is that this may be understood to mean that the invisible 
Trinity is a human being. Compare the statements 
God clung to Mary's neck 
and 
Mary held God in her arms. 
The first might well sound a little awkward to a Christian but not so much 
the second. The awkwardness in the first case is not, however, due to anything 
unsound in the doctrine of the Incarnation but rather to the fact that we tend 
to interpret the first statement in the following rather oxymoronic fashion: 
The invisible Trinity clung to Mary's neck. 
For more on the commensurability of the divine and human natures, the reader 
may wish to consult T. V. Morris's The Logic a/God Incarnate and the fourth 
volume of Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles.6 
IV 
The second theological claim is that 
The Word has the divine nature essentially but human nature accidentally. 
The traditional Christian teaching is that God's becoming human was a free 
and supererogatory deed. In some possible worlds, therefore, God is not a 
human being. Although God is and has to be divine, he is not necessarily 
human, and thus, in this sense, we may say that he has human nature 'acci-
dentally. ' 
Since being non-human is a nature, we may deduce from our definition that 
the Incarnation is an improbable event. We live in a strange and wonderful 
possible world. Like the tomato plant-rosebush, Jesus of Nazareth is a most 
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unusual object. Of course, this is merely part of what we mean when we say 
that Christmas is a miracle. In a more 'normal' possible world, God leaves 
humanity to suffer the natural consequences of sin. In the actual universe, 
however, God intervenes, giving us mercy we do not deserve, mercy which 
upsets the normal pattern of justice. What God has done is amazingly gener-
ous. It is for this reason that he deserves special thanks and praise for coming 
to save us.7 
v 
The third claim is that 
It is not possible for a non-divine human to acquire the divine nature. 
One might think that this claim is inconsistent with the previous claim that 
something can, at the same time, be both human and divine. In this section, 
we explain how the two claims are not inconsistent. 
A number of mystics, including the author of the Second Letter of Peter, 
suggest that an ordinary human being could become divine. s If we take the 
above definition of 'di vine,' however, it follows that no contingent being can 
become God. For according to the above definition, every divine being is 
noncontingent. Thus if x exists and is divine then x exists in all possible 
worlds. Hence it is not the case that in some possible worlds x exists whereas 
in other possible worlds x does not exist. Hence x is at no time contingent. 
If, then, non-divine humans are contingent, they cannot acquire the divine 
nature. Scripture verses about our 'sharing the divine nature' are thus best 
interpreted to mean that we shall become, not divine, but much more like 
God. We discuss this possibility in section VI. 
There are, no doubt, other definitions of 'human' and 'divine' according 
to which the transition from merely human to divine is possible. What makes 
my definitions interesting, precisely, is that, while allowing incarnations of 
gods, they exclude apotheoses of mere humans. With my definitions we have 
the traditional Christian view that, although the Word became flesh, there 
will always be an unbridgeable gap between ordinary humans and the divine 
human called 'Jesus.' The finite is nothing in comparison with the infinite. 
VI 
The fourth theological claim is that 
Non-divine humans who become Christians are given the higher nature of 
the 'spiritual man'. 
As Paul writes in the fourth chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians: 
You must be made new ill mind and spirit, and put on the new nature of God's 
creating, which shows itself in the just and devout life called for by the truth. 
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One could take this as being purely metaphorical but for Paul it has some 
important consequences which suggest that he took it literally. For one thing, 
the new spiritual person is free from the old law: he or she is bound only by 
a new and higher code of conduct. Paul even goes so far as to tell Titus that 
To the pure all things are pure.9 
For another thing, it is quite in line with Paul's thinking to hold that Christians 
are an improbable hybrid. When they get to heaven, they will still be human 
but they will also be extremely different from the way they are now. 10 Be-
cause of this, it may not be such a bad exegesis to take Paul as really meaning 
that Christians acquire a new nature. The improbable event of the Incarnation 
results in the improbable event of a saint becoming more than merely human. 
What is this new nature like? Its main features, I would say, are an in-
creased capacity for knowledge and love. The soul is 'illuminated.' Thus it 
is that 'the spiritual person can assess the value of everything.'11 Moreover, 
on account of this enriched ability to know and to love, the spiritual person 
can more easily take a God's eye view of ethical situations and judge them 
in a way that, in some cases, permits an action at variance with the dictates 
of natural law ethics for ordinary human beings. Thus 'to the pure all things 
are pure.' 
It does seem paradoxical that the same individual could both be subject to 
the morality of, say, natural law for humans, and also transcend that morality 
in Christ. Such paradoxes are the meat of good books on the Christian faith. 
Moreover, paradox is not contradiction, and no one has conclusively demon-
strated that Abraham acted immorally when, in obedience to a higher law, he 
set out to kill his innocent son Isaac. 
Because natures are not essences, there are possible worlds in which Saint 
Peter remained a sinner. Nonetheless, in the actual universe, his new spiritual 
life became the characteristic mark of the man, the meaning if not the defi-
nition of his life. Conversely, in the case of apostasy, we not unnaturally say 
that the ex -Christian has lost his identity, that he has become a different 
person. This is not literally true but there is truth enough in it to suggest that 
what he has lost is properly called his Christian nature. 12 
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